Archive for Army

Silence on Balochistan

Posted in Pakistan with tags , , , , , on September 1, 2009 by Umer

The closure of Daily Asaap, an Urdu newspaper from Balochistan, has gone unnoticed in great parts of Pakistan. The closure of the widely read and respected newspaper is followed by an assissination attempt on the Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper in February this year. A few days before the newspaper was closed down, the main office of Daily Asaap in Quetta was surrounded by Frontier Constabulary troops and Intelligence agencies officials. It is as clear as daylight that the newspaper has been “voluntarily” shut down due to permanent intimidation and harassment caused by the troops deployed at the gate of the newspaper.

It is highly disconcerting that no major newspaper, news channel, or organization of journalists has taken up this issue in any substantial manner. While the media of Pakistan considers it fit and proper to raise the issue of lawyers’ hooliganism, and rightly so, what stops them from launching a full-fledged campaign against a savage attack on the freedom of speech in Balochistan? Where are the demonstrations, road blocks, and hour long programs? One would expect the media to come out with all strength in defense of free speech and against the harassment of journalists. Sadly, this is not the case.

The closure of Daily Asaap will further alienate Balochistan from the rest of the country. The major perception in Balochistan is that people in the rest of Pakistan, particularly in Punjab, are the least bothered by any occurrence in Balochistan no matter how grave. The silence on the closure of Daily Asaap will further strengthen this perception. While the State agencies hopelessly try to find causes of Baloch grievances in foreign powers, it is we as the people of Pakistan who need to introspect to find where we have wronged the Baloch people.

The Swat offensive

Posted in Pakistan with tags , , , , , , , on June 16, 2009 by Umer

by Rashed Rahman

The military offensive in Swat Valley and surrounding districts of Malakand Division has more or less completed its initial phase. This may be a good moment therefore to assess the operation so far.

There is little doubt that there was a fundamental shift in the attitude of the army before such an unprecedented military offensive could be launched against the Taliban whom the military until recently was fond of referring to as its ‘strategic assets’. What led to this ‘change of heart’?

Under Musharraf as Chief of Army Staff (COAS), the duality in policy of capturing/killing Al-Qaeda members to assuage US post-9/11 rage and preserving the Afghan Taliban continued from after 9/11 until Musharraf’s ouster from power in September 2008. Along the way, US pressure to do something about the safe havens Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban enjoy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and which had permitted them to transform the relatively low intensity insurgency in progress since 2001 in Afghanistan into a more effective guerrilla war (helped enormously by Bush’s blundering into Iraq in March 2003), forced Musharraf in 2004 to send the army into FATA for the first time in Pakistan’s history. That campaign was a disaster. The army’s contingents were ambushed and literally cut to pieces. Clearly General Head Quarters (GHQ), the Pakistani military’s apex command, had forgotten the lessons of the British colonialists in fighting the Pashtun tribals in these areas.

The military debacle persuaded the army to sue for peace with the local militants in Waziristan and other tribal areas. Such agreements were totally to the benefit of the militants and humiliating for the ‘mighty’ Pakistan army’s pride. Nevertheless, the army swallowed its gall in the interests of trying to persuade the Pakistani Taliban to support the struggle in Afghanistan rather than challenge the writ of the Pakistani state. The watchful US military command in Afghanistan did not try to disguise its disquiet at these so-called peace agreements since it detected that an easing of the military pressure on the Pakistani side of the Pak-Afghan border meant increased attacks on their and NATO’s troops in Afghanistan. Hence at every given opportunity, they attempted to sabotage such agreements through missile strikes that took out the local Taliban commanders who had signed such deals with the Pakistan military. The Pakistani military still hoped (consistently since 2001) that the US and NATO would tire of the ‘futile’ and endless struggle in Afghanistan and GHQ and the Afghan Taliban would then easily step back into the relative power vacuum in Kabul, aided and abetted by their Pakistani Taliban facilitators and hosts. This was a serious underestimation of US determination not to repeat the mistake of allowing Afghanistan to slip once again into the Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s hands. Whatever other differences in policy Obama may have had with the outgoing Bush administration (for example on Iraq), on Afghanistan he declared for seeing the task through, albeit with a more nuanced policy.

In the interim, Musharraf and the Pakistani military continued on a strategy of raising the cost of the Western presence in Afghanistan through the Afghan Taliban, extracting in the process $ 11 billion dollars for the Pakistani military over eight years without any proper accounting of where this money went. Suspicions in the US Congress that the bulk of this money went to provide weapons for the Pakistani military to bolster its conventional arms balance against India have led to delays in and calls for accountability and transparency for any future US aid to the Pakistani military.

Under Musharraf, the Pakistani military came to be hated as never before by the people of Pakistan. The military’s overbearing attitudes, corruption and control of state and society under Musharraf evoked great resentment amongst the Pakistani people. When General Ashfaq Kayani took over as COAS last year, he and the military’s top brass embarked on a refurbishing of the military’s public image. This was conducted through an ostensible distancing of the army from politics and cooperation with the elected civilian government. The past collaboration between the military and the Pakistani Taliban incrementally gave way to a firmer posture of not allowing the Pakistani Taliban to challenge the writ of the state. The failure of the so-called peace agreement in Swat (a chronicle of a failure foretold) cleared the path for the current military offensive in Swat, backed as it now is by a changed public perception of the Taliban and their brutalities.

As for the offensive, the military has not cared a fig for the people of Swat, using heavy artillery, helicopter gunships and the air force to blast their way into the Valley from three directions at the cost of three million people’s displacement. These people fled for their lives in the face of this indiscriminate bombardment, which arguably saved many soldiers’ lives, but at the cost of so many tragic stories of local people killed, children and the old having to be abandoned, and the continuing misery of the displaced in camps and amongst host communities. The military advanced behind this heavy bombardment into Swat from the south, east and west. Despite this, they failed to cut off the escape routes of the Taliban (an inherently difficult task in such mountainous terrain). The result is that the Taliban leadership has by and large escaped, probably into surrounding mountains and FATA. That is the harbinger of a protracted war, especially since the military is now planning an offensive into South Waziristan, the stronghold of Baitullah Mehsud, the head of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.

The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) will have a tough time even after returning to their shattered homes, with no economic opportunities, smashed infrastructure and a huge reconstruction and rehabilitation task, which on the evidence of the government’s capabilities of looking after the IDPs promises to be another disaster to add to the long list of Pakistan’s miseries.

The situation is certainly at a turning point, especially since the inventors and mentors of the Taliban, the Pakistani military, has finally decided that the challenge to the state is too grave to brook any further prevarication. That does not, however, rule out the possibility that some of the Taliban may be persuaded to forego their challenge to the Pakistani state in exchange for being spared and diverted once again to the ‘export’ of jihad into Afghanistan and Kashmir. Whether this fond hope of GHQ materializes or suffers the same fate as their best laid plans of the last four decades to control Afghanistan in the name of ‘strategic depth’ and liberate Indian-administered Kashmir through jihad, only time will tell. However, what can be surmised at this juncture is that the whole jihad export enterprise has suffered a crippling blow. Whether the blow is fatal or something can be and will be salvaged from the ashes, it is difficult to say at this juncture. The Taliban having taken to hitting back throughout Pakistan through terror indicates that we are at the beginning of a long and bitter civil war whose outcome will determine the future direction of state and society. The present conjuncture represents a turn from the domination of the national agenda by the military and its Taliban cat’s paws. Without overcoming this phenomenon, Pakistani state and society cannot hope to clear the way for a more enlightened and hopeful future.

The writer is an acclaimed journalist and political analyst. This article is a part of his email series by the title of Pakistan Political Review. He can be reached at: rrahman@nexlinx.net.pk

Towards theocracy

Posted in Pakistan with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on March 12, 2009 by Umer

Pervez Amirali Hoodbhoy

Frontline on net

Note: This article appeared in the Frontline magazine of India. Therefore, the contents of the article and the message is addressed to the Indian audience. The article, nevertheless, is highly essential for us living in Pakistan.

Towards Theocracy: State and Society in Pakisan Today 

EMILIO MORENATTI/AP

Women in burqas and children from the Bajaur and Mohmand agency areas wait to be registered at a refugee camp near Peshawar in January. Today a full-scale war is being fought in FATA, Swat and other “wild” areas of Pakistan, with thousands dying and hundreds of thousands of displaced people streaming into cities and towns.  

FOR 20 years or more, a few of us in Pakistan have been desperately sending out SOS messages, warning of terrible times to come. Nevertheless, none anticipated how quickly and accurately our dire predictions would come true. It is a small matter that the flames of terrorism set Mumbai on fire and, more recently, destroyed Pakistan’s cricketing future. A much more important and brutal fight lies ahead as Pakistan, a nation of 175 million, struggles for its very survival. The implications for the future of South Asia are enormous.

Today a full-scale war is being fought in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), Swat and other “wild” areas of Pakistan, with thousands dying and hundreds of thousands of IDPs (internally displaced people) streaming into cities and towns. In February 2009, with the writ of the Pakistani state in tatters, the government gave in to the demand of the TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban Movement) to implement the Islamic Sharia in Malakand, a region of FATA. It also announced the suspension of a military offensive in Swat, which has been almost totally taken over by the TTP. But the respite that it brought was short-lived and started breaking down only hours later.

The fighting is now inexorably migrating towards Peshawar where, fearing the Taliban, video shop owners have shut shop, banners have been placed in bazaars declaring them closed for women, musicians are out of business, and kidnapping for ransom is the best business in town. Islamabad has already seen Lal Masjid and the Marriot bombing, and has had its police personnel repeatedly blown up by suicide bombers. Today, its barricaded streets give a picture of a city under siege. In Karachi, the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), an ethnic but secular party well known for strong-arm tactics, has issued a call for arms to prevent the Taliban from making further inroads into the city. Lahore once appeared relatively safe and different but, after the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team, has rejoined Pakistan.

The suicide bomber and the masked abductor have crippled Pakistan’s urban life and shattered its national economy. Soldiers, policemen, factory and hospital workers, mourners at funerals, and ordinary people praying in mosques have been reduced to hideous masses of flesh and fragments of bones. The bearded ones, many operating out of madrassas, are hitting targets across the country. Although a substantial part of the Pakistani public insists upon lionising them as “standing up to the Americans”, they are neither seeking to evict a foreign occupier nor fighting for a homeland. They want nothing less than to seize power and to turn Pakistan into their version of the ideal Islamic state. In their incoherent, ill-formed vision, this would include restoring the caliphate as well as doing away with all forms of western influence and elements of modernity. The AK-47 and the Internet, of course, would stay.

But, perhaps paradoxically, in spite of the fact that the dead bodies and shattered lives are almost all Muslim ones, few Pakistanis speak out against these atrocities. Nor do they approve of military action against the cruel perpetrators, choosing to believe that they are fighting for Islam and against an imagined American occupation. Political leaders like Qazi Husain Ahmed and Imran Khan have no words of kindness for those who have suffered from Islamic extremists. Their tears are reserved for the victims of predator drones, whether innocent or otherwise. By definition, for them terrorism is an act that only Americans can commit.

Why the Denial?

 

To understand Pakistan’s collective masochism, one needs to study the drastic social and cultural transformations that have made this country so utterly different from what it was in earlier times. For three decades, deep tectonic forces have been silently tearing Pakistan away from the Indian subcontinent and driving it towards the Arabian peninsula.

Continue reading

War in FATA

Posted in Communist Movement, International Affairs, Pakistan with tags , , , , , on October 6, 2008 by Umer

1. Should there be a war on Taliban?

Yes, there should be. Taliban are a decease that can only be eradicated militantly, as we all know. Despite, Taliban have not acceded others the courtesy to declare war. They have done so already. Now that the war is on and the negotiations have failed, and such attempts are bound to fail again in future, repeatedly due the fault whoever, the opposition to Taliban is left with two options: fight or surrender. Let’s be clear on that. And surrender to Taliban is not an option, in my view.

2. What is the position of the Pakistan Army on Taliban?

The neo-colonial Army of Pakistan continues to play the “double game” of supporting the Afghan Taliban at one end (against India and for many other objectives) and fighting against the Pakistani Taliban and the Al-Qaeda at the other end. This is contradictory policy and, at one level, may represent two trends in the Army that tolerate each other to maintain organizational unity. The position of Pakistan Army on the menace of religious extremism is that of vacillation and contradiction.

3. Can the Pakistan Army wage a war against Taliban?

It depends. The conservatives in the Army are willing to fight against the Taliban, and the reactionaries are hell-bent to sabotage the war effort. The question of which side in the Pakistan Army will dominate will depend on a number of factors, including which side will get the political and foreign support. People are Hameed Gul, JI, and the Ex-Servicemen are busy in activism for a reason: they are counting of their protégés in the Pakistan Army.

All in all, the efficacy of the Army’s actions against Taliban are depends highly on the internal dynamics of the institution.

Moreover, the neo-colonial Army is a blunt weapon that must be kept under close sight. Political and social efforts has to (read with emphasis) accompany the military effort to corner the Taliban from all sides.

4. Should there be democratic oversight over the military operations?

Yes, definitely. Since Army is an institution that is conservative at best, it cannot be given the complete authority to carry the operations. As the conflict in tribal areas is also carried out in the political arena, with religious reactionaries lining up against the parliamentary parties, it is important for the parliamentary actors and the people of Pakistan to have access to critical information. A democratic over-sight, in my view, is highly necessary and must be demanded.

5. What is the local support of the parties in the war?

The support of the various parties engaged in the parts appear to be divided on the tribal lines. There are tribes that treat Taliban and even Al-Qaeda as their hosts and are aligned with them. There are tribes, like Salarzai at the Upper Dir, who have been at the forefront of raising lashkars against the Taliban. Interestingly, the anti-Taliban lashkars have pledged complete support for the government (they know well that one cannot argue for long in the combat zone. Therefore, it appears to be that there are locals on both sides.

There are reports that important members of the Awami National Party (ANP) are being targeted on daily basis. The law enforcement agencies having failed to protect the leaders of ANP, the Party has decided to organize lashkars headed by peace committees in order to defend themselves against the threat of Taliban. The entrance of ANP in the active conflict is a decisive factor in determining where the local support lies in FATA.

6. What should be the stand regarding the military operations?

The stance on the military operations is highly reliant on the characteristic of the Army. We cannot call for stopping the operations. This is not only surrender to the Taliban (who have only regrouped and reorganized in the times of peace), but also the dream-wish of reactionaries in the Pakistan Army and the political supporters outside the institution. At the same time, we cannot also give a blank check to the Pakistan Army. Just like any bourgeois institution, it has its vacillations and, over that, it’s a conservative institution at best.

In view of the above observations, I propose:

a) Grant conditional support to operations against the Taliban: there must be strong criticism of the vacillation of the Army and the sabotage conducted by the reactionaries.

b) Demand that the local lashkars, particularly those under the leadership of ANP, which is threatened the most, be provided with logistical and material support. These armed groups must be defended at all costs.

c) Relentlessly criticize and deface the reactionary propaganda against the war by people like Hameed Gul and his kin.

d) Demand the parliamentary over-sight of the military operations so that the sabotage of the reactionary wing of the Army comes to limelight.

War in FATA – The Marxist View

Posted in Communist Movement, International Affairs, Marxism, Pakistan with tags , , , , , , , , , , , on September 21, 2008 by Umer

Let us begin from the first premise: What is the class character of the various forces that are in combat with each other? What are their aims? The position of the party of the proletariat must be clear; it can not consist of half-baked slogans, semi-support for one group and semi-support for the other—no it cannot be anything of the sort. Such positions, if taken to the masses, can only befuddle their minds.

“In any given situation, says Prachanda,”it is best in general terms to divide the struggle into its component parts—the forces of reaction (that seek to pull back the wheel of history), the forces of the status quo, and the forces of progress.”

I will use Comrade Prachanda’s rule of thumb as the benchmark—it is simple to grasp and easy to understand.

The present status quo is composed of an alliance between international finance capital, the comprador bourgeoisie and a section of the Pakistan Army that benefits from international finance capital. I will henceforth refer to this historical bloc simply, as the “status quo”.

1- The Taliban:

The Taliban represent the forces of reaction; let us be clear that they are not fighting a war against finance capital, or a war for national liberation. Let us also be clear that they are not even fighting a war for oppressed religious minorities.

Under what circumstances can the party of the proletariat support them? None.

2- The Pakistan Government

That a complete transition to bourgeois democracy has been made is un-dialectical. I agree. However, that is not the question that we are addressing.

As long as there is a temporary alliance between the class interests of the comprador bourgeoisie and a section of the army—leading to the formation of a new historical bloc—-they will jointly wage a battle against the Taliban.

To suggest—or to require—from contending class interests to always pursue their own course independently of other classes, even when there interests temporarily align against a common enemy is to reduce the class struggle into children’s playing field.

Yes, each class pursues a course of action, in the final analysis for its independent class aims and not for the aims of the allied class. But that does not imply that they will not ally against what they consider a common enemy. Contradictions are not immutable; antagonistic contradictions may metamorphisize into non-antagonistic ones and vice versa.

Coming back to the point—the Pakistan government at present is governed by the Pakistan People’s Party which historically represented the interests of the national bourgeoisie. That there has been a significant internal metamorphosis within the People’s Party, converting it into a party representing the interests of the comprador bourgeoisie is an important and objectively plausible hypothesis.

In either case, it is clear that they represent the forces that seek to maintain the present status quo as it stands.

3- The Pakistan Army

Does the Pakistan Army represent monolithic class interests? Or is it composed of different ideological strands?

If indeed, the Pakistan army is composed of different ideological strands, does this then imply that we can label its entire body under one caption: “Reactionary”. No it does not. Does it imply that we can label the entire Army as a force of the status quo? No it does not. Neither analysis is correct, in my opinion.

The Pakistan Army is composed of sections that represent the forces of the status quo, and forces that represent the forces of reaction. This corresponds to the historical evolution of the Pakistan Army over the course of the past 3 decades. During Zia’s military regime, the Mullahs were a part of the ruling historical bloc. As a result, a process of Islamization was conducted not only in the country, but within the Army as well. Professor Colonel Abdul Qayum was appointed as the Chief Advisor to the President, and was given the task of presenting a series of lectures on “iman, taqwa and jehad fi sabillillah” to young army officers. These three words became the motto of the Pakistan Army. Further, Abdul Qayum recalls in his book “Zia ul Haq and I”, that the process of Islamization was aimed at creating an ideologically Islamist army, though “a large chunk of officers resented and wanted a largely secular Army”. (Zia ul Haq and I, page 31)

Did the reactionary lobby within the Pakistan Army enjoy the same ascendancy within the ensuing 20 years after Zia’s death? No it did not. Does this imply that the reactionary lobby was annihilated? No it does not. The reactionary lobby continues to exist within the Army as a junior partner; however, the changing international situation and the corresponding crack in the hitherto existing historical bloc have changed the balance of forces not only in the country but within the Pakistan Army itself. During the course of the past 12 years the Askari Financial conglomerate has established itself as the leading financial body operating in Pakistan. Its interests are directly aligned with the interests of Imperialism. Therefore, it directly benefits from the dictates of imperialism.

Its ascendancy within the ranks of the Army corresponds to the emergence of the new historical bloc; the dethroning of the reactionary lobby within the Army corresponds to the fact that the new historical bloc has amputated relations with the forces of reaction. The dethroned forces exist and continue to agitate from within the ranks of the Army. Dozens of right-wing officers were forcefully retired during Musharraf’s period; hanged upon plotting his assassination thrice.

What should the Party of the Proletariat Do?

The Party of the proletariat has to decide its course of action given the situation. It cannot ask “what if” questions when the battle has already begun.

First, let me say at the outset that any moral headcount of the number of children and men being killed because of the war does no good to us. Casualty and injury are the byproducts of war; they are unfortunate but unavoidable. This is precisely why Marxist-Leninists have been the greatest advocates of peace; however, we understand that in order to make peace an objective reality the system of antagonistic classes that lies at the root of war must be eliminated. Any talk of peace without an objective appraisal of the situation and the balance of forces between the various classes amounts to pacifism. Furthermore, is it not juvenile to expect contending antagonistic class interests to “not get messy in war” when an opposing class has already taken up arms?
Second, as far as the operation and its logistical dynamics are concerned, it is obvious that the civilian government neither has the manpower nor the necessary skills to wage a battle itself. Military combat is an art and science; it is acquired through years of training. The only force capable of leading such an operation is the military itself. That the democratically elected government (both in the Federal capital and the Pakhtunkhwa province) supports the operation and has willingly given the military control of the operations (through a decision of the Pakistan People’s Party and the Awami National Party) suggests that even if the hegemony of the operation lies with the military its armed action cannot be called “unpopular” by any stretch of the imagination. The election campaigns of both the Pakistan People’s Party and the Awami National Party were replete with positions in support of an active struggle against the “Jehadi’s”. The Pakistan People’s Party contingent was targeted on numerous occasions by suicide bombers precisely because of its support for the Lal Masjid operation.

Given then that:

1- The war has already begun, and that it is pursuing a course of its own, independent of our subjective desires.
2- The Pakistan People’s Party (the party of the centre) and the Awami National Party (the party in the province) are openly and actively pursuing the war.
3- The Taliban have violated the terms of the peace negotiations and are plotting suicide bombs almost every week.

It is a matter of secondary importance (although not unimportant) then whether the hegemony of the operation lies with the elected government or with the army. Our support for the operation should be based on whether or not it seeks to annihilate the forces of reaction or not. Our Party supported the Lal Masjid operation at a time when even a partial transition to democracy had not been made. It supported the operation for its class aims; the routing of the forces of reaction by the forces of the status quo. A similar mode of analysis must be utilized to analyze this operation. Instead of falling into the abyss of pedantics we must support the operation since it takes on a head-on collision with the forces of reaction; forces which have most consistently been the enemies of progress, reason and science.

The proletariat cannot stand aloof in times of war; it does not impose pre-conditions on the bourgeois democrats for its historical struggle against pre-democratic forces. It supports every measure that challenges the forces of reaction and criticizes every move towards reconciliation. It is the most militant and consistent representative of progress; it can under no circumstances show any sympathy for forces of reaction either in the name of peace or under the guise of half-baked slogans. We must support any attempt, however imperfect, by the ruling status quo to annihilate the reactionaries. The criteria for support or opposition must be the class character of the contending forces and their goals in the broader historical context. The criteria for support must be: Does this in the broader view of history advance the cause of the proletariat by annihilating or making a dent in the ranks of all or at least one of its class enemies?

In my view, the present operation does indeed advance the cause of the proletariat by taking a head-on battle with the forces of reaction. Yes, it has many imperfections, like all political battles which are seldom in line with pedantic.

We must support the operation.

Developments in Balochistan

Posted in Pakistan with tags , , , , , on August 30, 2008 by Umer

A massive military operation was carried out under the Musharraf regime against the Baloch nationalis movement, starting in the last days of 2005, that resulted in further alienation and estrangement of the Baloch people with the Federation.

The present government, after the extension of apology by Asif Zardari to the Baloch people, is taking out some measure to bridge the huge gulf that marks the Baloch conflict.

Recently, Adviser to Prime Minister on Interior, Rehman Malik said that the government would release all political prisoners of Balochistan. He announced exclusions of names of all political leaders of the province from Exit Control List (ECL), including Nawab Khair Baksh Marri and Nawabzada Gazin Marri. He also informed that Sardar Akhtar Mengal is living in Sharja as a result of these measures.

Rehman Malik also said, after his meeting with high government officials from Balochistan, that he had a list of 1,102 people who are missing in Balochistan.

This is quite shocking, moreso for the reason that it is Rehman Malik who is giving out this information. One perception can be that there is still heavy presence and influence of military in Balochistan, an expected hangover from the decade of military rule, that is creating hindrances for the provincial and federal governments to operate in Balochistan.

In this perspective, the government’s decision to abolish 35 of the 54 FC Posts in Balochistan is a welcome step. This can help in removing the military presence from Balochistan to some extent.

One may welcome these steps (they certainly give a respite to the Baloch people and allow them space to organize politically), the government’s actions must be scrutinized properly. One objective of the government appears to concentrate on fighting the Taliban in the NWFP. Fighting the Taliban is necessary. However, if the fight in not conducted properly, especially if it is conducted within the paradigm of “war of terror” and with a strategy dictated by the U.S. Imperialism, the spill-over of the war can be very dangerous for the people of Pakistan and can strengthen the reactionary forces of religious extremists (as it is often correctly pointed out, the two barbarisms fighting the “war on terror” reinforce each other).

While grant of certain civil liberties to the Baloch leaders must be supported, it must be crystal clear that this does not solve the Baloch conflict in any way. The recent debate in debate in Senate, leading to snubbing of Kashmir Affairs Minister Qama Zaman Kaira by female senators from Balochistan, shows what the Baloch problem is actually about. The debate in the Upper House started when it was pointed out that out of a total sum of Rs 17 billion given from Pakistan Baitul Maal to the provinces during the last five years, the Punjab got Rs 8.9 billion, Sindh Rs 3.6 billion, the NWFP Rs 3.2 billion and poor Balochistan received only Rs 704 million. Islamabad alone got 901 million, more than Balochistan!

Can the government of People’s Party solve the Baloch conflict to the end? I seriously doubt. The Baloch problem can only end with the relentless struggle by the Baloch population, of which they are perfectly capable. The present times call for the Baloch people to organize rapidly in the struggle for their social and economic rights. The progressives from other provinces, particularly Punjab, who have consistently supported the Baloch national struggle in their silent ways, must also utilize the liberty accorded to the Baloch nationalist leadership to mobalize public support from the masses of their respective provinces for the Baloch national cause.

References:

Govt to release all political prisoners of Balochistan, says Rehman Malik
http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=50729&Itemid=2

Over 1,100 people missing in Balochistan, says Malik
http://www.dawn.com/2008/08/28/top10.htm

Most FC posts in Balochistan to be abolished: Baloch leaders to be released, cases to be withdrawn
http://www.dawn.com/2008/08/29/top2.htm

‘Islamabad alone grabbed more charity money than Balochistan’
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=132725

CMKP Celebrates Musharraf’s Resignation

Posted in Communist Movement, Pakistan with tags , , , , on August 18, 2008 by Umer

Pervez Musharraf resigned today, in Islamabad. The iron fist with which he imposed his will has shattered today and the will of the people has been restored to the halls of the presidency.

The Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party welcomes this long overdue step and sees it at a respite from the nine long years of military dictatorship. The Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party is hopeful that those generals of the Pakistan Army who have grown accustomed to stepping on civilian controlled organs of the State and the rights of the people of Pakistan will take heed from this occurrence and see that the people of Pakistan will never accept their dictatorship in the future.

The Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party would also like to bring it to the attention of the ruling coalition that the will of the masses dictates that no safe exit should be granted to this mass-murderer; that he should be tried for his crimes in a civilian court of law in accordance with the Law of the country.

Press Secretariat

Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party